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1. Introduction. 
Plagues, migration, political and institutional disorder characterized the centuries after the 
decline of the (western part of the) Roman Empire. The trading networks, which not only 
included the different parts of the Roman Empire but the < barbarian world= (that=s us) as well,  
deteriorated as the <barbarians’ attacked Roman strongholds with swords manufactured and 
traded by the Roman smiths.  Although the intruders soon learnt and adopted the local 
language and culture, the unity and cohesion of the Roman world had vanished. Population 
declined where disorder and epidemics reigned even though we are not sure about the extent 
of that decline. There are those who argue - but this is not a well-established result - that the 
population of Roman England was not attained again until just before the outbreak of the 
Black Death, c.1350.  
How can we settle a dispute about the size of ancient populations when we do not have 
written records? Archeologists struggle to measure the extent of the cultivated land at 
different points in time and then make assumptions about  the number of people that could be 
supported by, say, each cultivated acre. Needless to say these estimates have a wide margin of 
error. 
The decline in population was accompanied by diminishing specialization, and the absence of 
the rule of law fostered a tendency in the weak to abdicate rights and/or property in exchange 
for protection. Europe entered a long phase of technological retardation and a decline in per 
capita income. Central power was not very efficient, giving local (war) lords a bigger say. 
Furthermore, the Mediterranean world became split into religious spheres, a split which 
remains to this very day. Paradoxically the Post- Roman  period of economic decline was the 
formative period of two emerging world religions, Christianity and Islam, of which the latter 
had its humble roots in a nomadic economy. The extent to which this split affected mutual 
trade has been researched and debated intensely but the traditional view that it delivered a 
deadly blow to long distance trade does not stand up to scrutiny. However, written documents 
from this period are rare. Trade relations are inferred from archeological finds of coins and 
goods and are not always easy to interpret. 
By the end of the first millennium A D, perhaps as early as around 700, things began to 
change. Cities, that had been abandoned attracted people again. In fact most of the urban 
regeneration  occurred in old Roman settlements. Often cities were linked to administrative 
and religious nodes but they attracted merchants and skilled workers as well. Political order 
 
 5 
was about to be restored in Europe. When Charlemagne was crowned in Rome by the Pope in 
the year 800, he ruled a territory not much different from the West Roman Empire, but it was 
ruled from German lands, from Aachen, (Aix). Political order stimulated coinage and money 
circulated easier. After the first attempts at the  reunification of Europe, a pattern of nations 
emerged which has shown considerable continuity to this very day. Most importantly 
population began to rise and trade and city life regained some of its former vigour. This is 
when our story begins. 
  
2. Population and Resources. 
2.1. The traditional view exposed and challenged. 
The traditional view of pre-industrial growth and stagnation has been inspired by the classical 
economists, Ricardo and Malthus,  and discusses the interplay between population growth and 
limited land resources, but ignores technological progress. It is also based on the implicit 
belief that the economy is exploiting its resources efficiently at all times. 
 
Before proceeding we should dwell a little on why there is a tradition of talking about pre-
industrial as opposed to industrial or modern growth? To start with it is a question of 
magnitude. Not until the 19th century do we have growth rates in terms of GDP/capita above 
one half of a  per cent per year over long periods. Pre-industrial economies are predominantly 
agrarian, growth is slow and sometimes absent over long stretches of time. Although the rural 
population in the Netherlands was as low as 40 per cent of total population around the year 
1500, in most other European economies that share  was closer to 80 per cent. That means 
that unlike modern economies, pre-industrial economies  were dependent on a  factor of 
production, land, that was only available in fixed supply. 1 Not only could modern economies 
diversify out of agriculture and relax their dependence on land, they increasingly relied on a 
multitude of produced production factors, and the increasingly important one was non- 
exclusive: knowledge. Knowledge is non-exclusive because A’s use of it does not  exclude 
                                                          
1 To say that a factor is in fixed supply is, however, particularly ambiguous when 
land is concerned because land can be used at widely different intensities over time. At one 
extreme, slash and burn agriculture uses land for a few annual harvests after which land 
remains in fallow for decades. At the other extreme, you can have several crops per year in 
rice cultivation in subtropical areas and in the cultivation of vegetables in the temperate zone. 
Fixed supply is always defined relative to a given technological level. 
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B’s use of it, even though B’s use of it can be prevented for a limited period if the knowledge 
is protected by patent law. Patents link private and social gains from innovative labour and  
therefore give innovators  an incentive to devote resources to research and experiments. 
Patent protection developed as early as 17th century but became widely practiced after the 
industrial breakthrough. Technological progress in the pre-industrial period was, however, not 
based on scientific inquiry in the modern sense but mainly of trial and error and learning by 
doing. Despite the fact that patent law is more closely monitored in modern  economies  It 
seems as if the diffusion of new knowledge is much faster in modern economies than in the 
pre-industrial era. 
Pre-industrial economies also made use of knowledge as expressed in the state of know how. 
Knowledge was embodied in tools, in methods of land improvements and rotation of crops, 
which affected the fertility of land, but the growth of knowledge, i.e. technological progress, 
was less rapid than in the industrial era. Furthermore, pre-industrial economies were 
characterized by population dynamics, which differ from that of a modern developed 
economy. Today we recognize a negative correlation between income per capita and 
population growth in most advanced economies. Pre-industrial economies differed. The 
traditional Malthusian view ( named after the classical economist and David Ricardo’s 
contemporary, Thomas Malthus) suggests a positive relationship between income and 
population growth but as we will see, the pattern is much more complicated. 
 
In the analysis of long-term growth one is usually inclined to believe that supply forces are 
what really matters. The implicit assumption is that available resources are efficiently used, a 
doctrine, to quote George Grantham, that all opportunities are currently exhausted or ex-
ploited.  However, economic historians disagree about the extent to which resource 
constraints were actually binding, because they disagree about whether resources and 
technology were efficiently used or not. The view defended by the present author suggests 
that the institutional conditions for the efficient use of resources and technologies were not 
always present. In the real world, market imperfections and market failures can prevail for 
long periods and traditional economic analysis does not pay sufficient attention to the 
institutional requirements for economic development, such as political and legal order.  I will 
show that pre-industrial economies often operated below their capacity, given resources and 
technology.  
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However, before we consider  these problems we have to look more closely at the traditional 
view.  A dominant tradition2 suggests that the fate of the pre-industrial world was narrowly 
constrained by limited resources i.e. primarily land in economies that  had 80-90 percent of 
the population in agriculture, because of slow or non-existing technological change.  When 
land became scarce after a period of population growth diminishing returns became a serious 
obstacle to continued growth because land of inferior quality had to be cultivated or because 
the existing land was now shared by a larger population. The population profile of an 
economy with a given technology was assumed to look like the schedule in Figure 1 below.  
Per capita income is falling from high of the left hand  part  of the horizontal axis to 
subsistence . High income stimulates population growth but only to the point at which 
diminishing returns had reduced income to subsistence level, that is a  level which can only 
sustain the population at its existing size. When population growth approached zero, the 
population had reached its absolute limit. Any population increase above that level must be 
transitory and bring income below subsistence level and increase mortality or decrease the 
birth rate, or both. What would happen if we allowed for a positive technological shock, that 
is a shift to a permanently higher level of technological knowledge? A technological shock, as 
opposed to a permanent  rate of technological change, will only generate a transitory increase 
in income per head  and a period of positive population growth after which the economy will 
again converge to the subsistence wage but now at  a higher constant population. This 
mechanism is illustrated by a shift from the low level to the high level technology in Figure 1. 
Poverty induced mortality is what Malthus referred to as the positive checks on population 
growth. Moral or other deliberate constraints on fertility were referred to as preventive 
checks. The population theory we have just sketched is normally referred to as Malthusian 
and has survived to the present day, now with the prefix neo-. It is worth noting that his 
theory  was refuted by history most dramatically in the years when Malthus lived and worked 
- during the Industrial Revolution - which transformed the British economy and permitted a 
rate of population growth never seen before or after on the British Isles. It is unclear to what 
extent rising income was driving this spurt in population. In fact, the distribution of income 
might have become more unequal, hurting the poor and populous classes in this period, but 
                                                          
2  H. J. Habakuk, ‘The economic history of modern Britain’, Journal of Economic History, 
18,1958, pp.1484-501. 
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P 
nevertheless sustained population growth turned out not to hit a resource constraint because 
available resources were more efficiently used. 
 
Figure 1. The Malthusian population profile in an economy with limited resources and 
in two technological regimes. 
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ome neo-malthusians maintain that they do not (and/or that Malthus did not) exclude 
echnological change. As is demonstrated in Appendix 1, the introduction of a permanent 
ositive rate of technological change ( as opposed to a single one-off technological shock as 
escribed above) fundamentally alters the predictions of the theory: The economy will not 
evert to a subsistence level of income and can maintain a positive rate of population growth 
f there is a constant and permanent rate of technological progress despite (constant) 
iminishing returns. 
his analytical framework fits much better to the pattern of population growth in Europe if 
ou add the fact that the periods of dramatic population decline are caused by exogenous, 
eaning largely non-economic, forces. There was, see Figure 2 above, a long phase of 
opulation increase fostered by the emergence of the Roman empire and economic prosperity 
o be followed by political disruption and population decline setting in around 200 AD. 
enturies of political disorder and epidemics followed and that phase was broken around 800 
D, after which population increased steadily to the middle of 14th century. The population 
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numbers in Roman Europe were not attained until around 1200. The mortality effect of the 
Black Death, a plague4 that entered Europe through Sicily in 1347, having been more or less 
absent from Europe since around 600 AD, is enormous. Following this devastating outbreak, 
the plague had a series of minor re-occurrences over the next 100 years. The immediate 
impact is disputed and varied a little from region to region but an estimated third, perhaps 
even more, of the European population died of the disease. Population did not really recover 
until well into the 15th century. We then have a period of slow growth until the beginning of 
the 18th century, somewhat later in some countries, somewhat earlier in others, until growth 
suddenly breaks away to much higher rates that remain until the middle or end of the 19th 
century when growth again slows down. 
The Malthusian view links limited resources and population growth to declining income, 
which triggers off positive checks on population growth. Therefore, when a population has 
reached its steady state for a given technology  as described in Figure 1, only transitory 
movements around the constant population level would be expected. However, the large 
negative shocks to population were not transitory and they were not endogenous (i.e. 
triggered off by poverty) but were driven by exogenous factors such as epidemics and/or   
political collapse and chaos. Not until the 19th century did man succeeded, to some extent, in 
controlling the disease environment by improved hygiene and vaccination. In fact, the role of 
hygiene was little understood until the 19th century. Before that time civilizations were 
practically unable to control  the plagues and epidemics and as a rule, political disorder 
increased disease mortality because human migration increased and spread diseases. This 
contributed to the fall in Post-Roman population. The main reason for the drastic decline of 
the native populations of the Americas between 1500 and 1600, see Figure 2, was the fact that 
the Europeans had acquired limited immunity to infectious diseases unknown to the original 
population in the Americas (or Australia). Europe exported economic and political 
domination, Christianity and smallpox. A mixed blessing, indeed. 
                                                          
4 The bacillus (yersina pestis) that causes the plague is carried by fleas, which use 
rats, mice or humans as their host. 75 to 80 percent of infected humans died. 
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The traditional idea that the immediate pre-1350 period represented a type of Malthusian 
population maximum with income at subsistence levels as in  Figure 1, suggests that 
population had ceased to grow before the Black Death. This view, known as the Postan-Titow 
view, and developed with reference to England, suggests that centuries of uninterrupted 
population growth changed the balance between arable land and pasture. When pasture gave 
away to arable farming, agriculture was deprived of an indispensable source of natural 
fertilizer, animal dung. Thus land quality deteriorated as a consequence, taking yields and 
income down with it. Opponents of this view doubt the interpretation of the English evidence 
of declining yields in arable agriculture.5 In continental Europe yield data indicate huge 
regional variations. Furthermore, precise aggregate population data on the pre-1350 period 
are not available, as opposed to local data, where the record, on balance, does not lend itself 
to strong conclusions. The population disasters both after the Roman disintegration  and  in 
the hundred years after 1350 cannot easily be described as transitory and are much too large 
to be interpreted as a Malthusian positive check. A possible line of defence for the Malthusian 
view could be to argue  that the reason why the Black Death  had such a  profound impact  
was that income and nutritional levels had become so low when population finally hit the 
resource constraint that people were very vulnerable to diseases. However, the Black Death 
was not, like some other communicable diseases such as TB (tuberculosis), a <poor devils= 
type of disease. It took away rich and poor in equal proportions.  
As will be examined below, there is evidence that there was great regional diversity in yields, 
which indicates prospects of productivity gains for those following the productivity leader, 
and more importantly, this evidence suggests that the postulate of markets <exhausting all 
available opportunities given by technology and resources’ might not be valid. Surprisingly, 
at least from a Malthusian perspective, the regions in pre-industrial Europe with the highest 
per capita income, such as the ‘Low countries’, the Paris basin and Southeast England, were 
also the most densely populated, which indicates that the land constraint was not as rigid as 
often argued. As suggested in Appendix 1, the most advanced regions had a much more 
intensive use of land, that is, more crops per unit of land and time, substituted land for labour 
and diversified production. Human ingenuity helped to ease the constraints of limited land. 
The Malthusian model disregards this because it is a closed one good model. If we introduce 
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5 M. Desai, ’The agrarian crisis in medieval England: A Malthusian tragedy or a failure of entitlements?’ 
Bulletin of Economic Research, 43, 3, 1991, pp. 223-58. 
trade and specialization, we clearly see the scope for interregional specialization, also in 
agricultural production. The foreign exchange that England gained from wool exports could 
pay for the claret (red wine from the Bordeaux area) that England imported. Land scarce areas 
developed urban skills and labour intensive food products that could be exchanged for land 
intensive products from remote areas where land constraints were less of a problem. Regions 
in Europe were good at exploiting the comparative advantages from differences in resource 
endowments. 
Summing up: The fundamental prediction of the Malthusian view is that economies converge 
to a steady state of constant population at subsistence income. However income has, for most 
regions during most of the pre-industrial era (for which we have population estimates), been 
above subsistence level and has permitted population growth interrupted only  by strong 
exogenous negative shocks.  
 
2.2. Short and long run population dynamics: further doubts concerning the Malthusian 
story.
Does the importance of exogenous mortality shocks in population dynamics deprive 
economic forces, real income, of a role? Not necessarily. We need to recognize, however, that 
population growth is determined by nuptiality, fertility and mortality. Fertility was affected 
both by marital fertility, that is fertility within a given household, as well as by nuptiality, 
which is the timing and proportion of a cohort actually getting married. In difficult times the 
age of marriage was postponed, for some indefinitely, and this influenced fertility. These 
preventive checks on population growth have, by and large, been more important than the 
Malthusian positive checks, i.e. economically induced mortality. Unlike fertility, mortality is 
not the subject of human choice. There is not much you can do about the fact that, ‘ in the 
long run we are all dead’ (J.M.Keynes). However until the last two centuries there was little 
man could do to influence even  the timing of death, that is life expectancy. The fact that the 
expected length of life has doubled over the last two centuries is associated with improved 
welfare such as better housing and food, government sponsored public health and sanitation 
policies, such as compulsory health controls and vaccinations, and deliberate life style choices 
enhancing health, such as giving up smoking and/or excessive drinking. 6 In the analysis of 
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6 R. A. Easterlin, ‘How beneficial is the market. A look at the modern history of  mortality’, in European Review 
of Economic History, 3,3, 1999, pp. 257-94. 
pre-industrial population trend growth it is therefore meaningful to concentrate on fertility 
and nuptiality decisions since they were taken given the exogenously determined life 
expectancy. 
We need to look at this issue in a long, i.e. trend, and a short run, i.e. transitory deviations 
from trend, perspective. First the long run. We usually assume that there is a positive impact 
of per capita income on trend population growth in the pre-industrial period. There are two 
very different motivations for the positive association of population growth and income. The 
Malthusian positive check variety suggests that there is a tendency to attain some 
reproductive maximum   and only economic hardship will keep actual population growth 
below that target. Any easing of economic conditions would generate a spurt in population 
growth through declining mortality. This view, looking at man as a copulating machine, has 
been discredited by sober scholarship, and, before that, by common sense. Modern research 
stresses that non-exogenous changes in population growth are mediated by nuptiality induced 
fertility variations. The other view uses the fundamental insights from consumption theory, 
which indicate that demand for a good or service is increasing with income, the so-called 
income effect, and declining with the price of the service, the so-called substitution effect. 
Now, you may argue that this view degrades the motives of human beings in that it neglects 
that love and affection can be strong motives for families raising children, but there is not a 
contradiction between the two views. Consumption theory does not deny that love and 
affection form the preferences for children but humbly suggests that the number of children 
might be influenced by economic factors such as income and the costs of raising a family, 
which does not strike me as surprising or morally offensive.7 From this perspective an 
increase in income - the cost of children unaffected - would stimulate family size. Indeed, we 
would be inclined to interpret at least some changes in trend growth of population as 
determined by income. It turns out that nuptiality and fertility rates respond in the predicted 
way to changes in economic variables, - wheat price increases cause fertility and nuptiality to 
decline.8 But this simple explanation goes fundamentally astray when we get to the late 19th 
and 20th centuries, where sustained income growth is associated with a decline in family size 
and population growth, not only in Europe but in other parts of the world. In the 20th century 
                                                          
7 You can see  the demand for children as derived demand for food, since children do not produce, which makes 
the consumption theory approach attractive. 
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the most certain predictor of a decline in family size is rising income and increased 
educational level. However, we should not be too quick to turn against the simple insights 
from consumption theory. Although family size is stimulated by income growth, the income-
effect, we also suggested that family size is negatively correlated with the cost of raising 
children, the substitution effect. That cost is related to the education of children and the 
opportunity cost of having children, i.e. the labour supply of the adult members of the family 
is negatively affected by raising children. In pre-industrial economies the opportunity cost of 
having children was quite low, there were no schools to attend  and children were soon put to 
work or tool care of the small ones. These conditions changed with the advent of the 
industrial economy. Child labour was eventually prohibited or restricted  and educational 
standards had to improve for children to be able to enter the labour market. Hence despite the 
fact that family size declined with income, the income spent on raising a smaller family  
increased in the 20th century.
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8 See for example R. Schofield’s ‘Short-run and secular demographic reponses to fluctuations in the standard of 
living in England’, in  T.Bengtson and O.Satio (eds) Population and Economy,From Hunger to Modern 
Economic Growth. Oxford University Press, Oxford:2000, pp. 49-71. 
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This is a simple endogenous explanation of income and substitution effects in population 
growth, suggesting that income effects dominated substitution effects until the 19th century, 
but we still encounter a series of empirical puzzles which tend to play down its explanatory 
power. Going back to the historical record it is possible that the slower population growth in 
the 17th century was the effect of the falling income. The demographic mechanism, it must be 
added, was not a Malthusian positive, i.e. mortality, check but rather voluntary restraints on 
fertility, so-called preventive checks.9 When earnings were depressed the age of marriage was 
                                                          
9 The existence of voluntary restraints is, to some extent, surprising because there is 
the  temptation of <demographic free riding=. An externality actually lies at the heart of the 
matter.  If there are diminishing returns when an increasing population chases existing land, it 
is not only the income of the marginal labourer that is affected. When a family which decides 
to raise another child, it will demand more resources from the common, making it harder not 
only for themselves but all others to feed the cattle that graze on the common,  to collect 
wood for fuel and to hunt and fish. Their behaviour will also have future effects on the market 
for day-labour. This is the simple economics of overpopulation seen as a sub-optimal state of 
affairs in which each individual household is guided by a calculus of private costs and gains, 
but neglects the social costs associated with these actions. And there is no simple solution  
because why should one family exhibit constraint and risk that others do not. However, pre-
industrial societies accommodated  this predicament in different ways. In Russia there was a 
leaning towards an equitable distribution of village resources and there was, therefore, no 
attempts to internalize the externality. There was, as a consequence, few constraints on 
population growth. On the contrary, in the extreme case where the family could get land in 
 
 16 
usually delayed or postponed infinitely for some, which lowered birth rates per fertile woman, 
as noted above. 
Was the 18th century increase in European population growth determined by the fact that the 
hardships experienced in the 17th century were overcome? This issue is presently the subject 
of intense debate and research.  We are still not sure about the causes behind the radical shift 
that occurred  in the 18th century. From a purely demographic point of view, we suspect that 
the immediate cause was that the number of live births and children reaching mature age per 
fertile woman increased and that the life expectancy also rose  for those reaching  adult age. 
But why? Was it because of improved pre-natal nourishment of mothers and better post-birth 
hygiene? If so, we would  expect to see  rising income, and the evidence is mixed on that 
point, or that a portion of the constant family budget was redirected towards mothers. The 
increased life expectancy of  adults is often related to the chances of surviving the first crucial 
years, in that those generations that suffered frequent spells of epidemics at young ages often 
experienced lower life expectancy as adults.   
There might be exogenous forces at work as well, such as a less hostile disease environment. 
The reason why we cannot always identify shifts in trend growth as generated by economic 
conditions is that some short run demographic processes might be unintended. The probability 
of a live birth actually reaching a mature age was very low. And we would expect that 
households took that fact into account. However small changes in child mortality might not 
affect fertility strategy immediately. It might take some time before the new information sinks 
in and family strategies might rely on rule of thumb rather than deliberate and frequent 
reconsideration of family size strategy. Rules of thumb are, however, subject to change when 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
proportion to its size, the entire social cost was assumed by the others.  In Western Europe the 
inheritance and marriage pattern generated constraints on population growth, such as delaying 
marriage age or increasing the proportion of non-married males and females.  Inheritance 
rules might favour the oldest son thereby diminishing marriage prospects of younger sons and 
daughters, which in turn would affect population growth. Restricted access to the common 
property could  also contain population since it is a way of internalising the externalities 
associated with population growth.   
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the conditions that generated them have changed. 
But even if the immediate cause behind the 18th century population increase was partly non-
economic a Malthusian interpretation would predict increased competition for available 
resources and falling income. But there is no evidence of a decline in income as population 
growth picks up. This suggests that the resource constraint assumed by the Malthusians was 
not rigid. There are two possible and not mutually exclusive explanations for this. First 
Malthusians might have underestimated the opportunity for technological change and second 
the population increase might have triggered off the enclosure (privatisation) of common 
land, a phenomenon that was  sweeping Europe as population grew. There is evidence from 
rising land rentals data that the common, when and if privatised, was used more efficiently.   
There is an additional reason why we have reason to be sceptical about the Malthusian stress 
on resource constraints on population movements. Short term economic distress had , as we 
have already observed, an impact on short term population movements, mainly through 
fertility and nuptiality but also through mortality. The mortality response was often indirect 
and occurred with a time-lag. A series of poor harvests, the causes of which again, in most 
cases, were exogenous (poor weather, plant diseases, war etc.) caused income for practically 
all groups in society to decline. But few people died of outright starvation. They died of 
communicable diseases that followed famines, often with a time-lag. First, because famines 
triggered off migration, groups that had not been exposed and acquired immunity to certain 
diseases now became vulnerable. Second because the famine lowered the nutritional status of 
people and made them more susceptible to those diseases, which unlike the plague , were of 
the <poor devils= variety. However, the short run effects can hardly be interpreted as 
Malthusian positive checks, i.e. as corrections of  <overpopulation= and a reversion to a lower 
level of population (growth) as demonstrated in the typical pattern of population response in 
Figure 3 below.  
 
 
 18 
Figure 3. Population growth in France 1670- 1785. 
 
Source: J-M. Chevet, Les crises démographique en France à la fin du XVIIe siècle et au 
XVIIIe siècle: un essai de mesure, Histoire & Mesure, 1993, pp. 117-144.  
 
 
In Figure 3 we show an important characteristic of short run population movements in France. 
As you can see, the troubled 1690s were a famine period with disastrous effects on popula-
tion, but this was followed by a fast adjustment of the population back to its historical trend 
growth. The same pattern is repeated after the subsequent subsistence crises in the 18th 
century. In technical jargon it seems as if population is trend growth stationary rather than 
stationary around a Malthusian maximum. Behind this patterns are two forces. The elderly 
and the young are particularly vulnerable in a famine crisis but the age specific mortality of 
these groups declines for a short period after  the crisis has been overcome. Fertility decisions 
are often postponed in a crisis just to be compensated for after the crisis. Thus  excess 
mortality and under-fertilty during  the crisis are replaced by under-mortality and excess 
fertility after the crisis.  
Summing up: Economic forces influenced long run population growth through fertility 
variations. Malthusian positive, i.e. mortality, checks were transitory, a spell of excess 
mortality in  crisis was followed by low mortality in a post-crisis period. 
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3. Pre-industrial institutions. Money, markets and property relations. 
3.1. Money, credit and banking. 
Economists do have, and rightly so, a natural inclination to look for some efficiency charac-
teristics in stable institutions. This follows from a world outlook that conceptualises  man as a 
fairly rational creature which forms institutions in an implicit or explicit contractual process 
in which each party bargains in its own interest, which under some conditions can generate  
the common good  or  mutual benefits. The elementary institutions in economic life can easily 
be shown to generate efficiency gains. Money was already in general use before time that our 
story begins. Some well-defined medium of exchange - but not necessarily coins of precious 
metals - has been used since the dawn of civilization. But why did money replace direct barter 
of goods? There are several reasons which all relate to the fact that in the real world there are 
asymmetric information, transaction costs and uncertainty. In a barter economy we have to 
solve the problem of 'coincidence of wants', i.e., the matching of, say, a seller of cloth who 
wants iron and a seller of iron who wants cloth.  The matching is time-consuming and often 
involves future deliveries, that is all exchange is not spot exchange. For example the seller of 
cloth might want to postpone the purchase of iron to some future date. It is of course possible 
to enter a contract for future delivery but such contracts immediately open up the risk of  the 
supplier not honouring the contract unless costly contract enforcement mechanisms are 
present. This uncertainty can be detrimental to exchange because producers will not attain the 
desired level of exchange. Money solves both the 'coincidence of wants' and uncertainty 
problems because a seller of cloth now does not need to find a seller of the good she wants to 
buy who also happens to need cloth. By  changing cloth for money, the cloth-producer can 
buy iron on the spot market if and when it is required, or some other good if the cloth-
producer changes her mind. Money becomes a convenient store of value because it is 
accepted by all as a means of payment. 
The money used in the pre-industrial period had an intrinsic value since coins were made of 
gold, silver or copper. Paper money convertible to gold was used from time to time in the 
18th century but had a turbulent history up to the 19th century when it became widespread 
and backed by private  or national banks. The issuing monopoly of national banks occurred  
during the last  two centuries.  Another advantage of the  intrinsic value of money is that its 
true value is easily detected by almost everybody unlike most other goods. The frequent use 
of a given monetary instrument is one reason for this.  If many competing means of payment 
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were in use, the public would not gain the same profound knowledge about their values. Let 
us now leave this brief discussion of money for that basic institution that uses money daily: 
the market. 
(This section will be extended on credit and banking in a future version of this note) 
 
3.2. Market performance in history. 
Money greatly helps market transactions because it is a store of value, but rudimentary 
markets can be based on barter since the essential instrument, price, is also present  in barter, 
i.e. being the ratio at which one unit of one good is exchanged for x units of another. Markets 
using money have a history starting early but even when money helped the transactions 
markets remained imperfect and inefficient in the pre-industrial period because goods and 
information travelled slowly. 
 
Two factors dominate short term price movements in pre-industrial economies:  a random 
element driven by new information about supply generated by natural accidents and a 
significant auto-correlation. Auto-correlation means that prices today contain information 
about prices tomorrow. This contradicts the efficient market hypothesis which maintains that 
all available information is contained in the present price. If consumers know today that 
prices are expected to rise tomorrow consumers, will be expected to purchase their goods 
today thus forcing prices up immediately. Price changes tomorrow should be generated only 
by new information. But this does not seem to be the case in actual markets for a large class 
of commodities. There are several reasons for this. Most consumers have cash-constraints and 
little access to credit so they cannot actively speculate or hoard goods. With limited storage of 
goods it is also difficult to postpone purchases even if prices are expected to fall. An 
additional factor worth mentioning is that many goods were perishable and could only  be 
stored for  very limited period of time. 
 
Let us first discuss the magnitudede of the random element, i.e. is the price change driven by 
new information about supply shocks. If that magnitude is small there is no need to worry.  
However, until the middle of the 19th century, price volatility was high, much stronger than 
the underlying shocks in local harvest outcomes, which implies that real wages also varied a 
lot since nominal wages changed little in the short run. What is true for wage earners is not 
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necessarily true for producers of food. When harvests failed, prices exploded, but for the 
majority of peasants there was little comfort from that because they did not have any food to 
bring to the market.  
A sceptic might argue that large real wage variations are not worse than small ones. Even if it 
is true, the sceptic admits that large variations trigger off an occasional sharp decline in 
consumption and this can be compensated by the occasional sharp increases. Contemporaries 
disagreed on these matters as witnessed  by the endless pamphlets written and the concern 
rulers have shown for calming  price volatility since Roman  times. The conventional 
argument for the desirability of stable prices rather than variations around a constant price is 
that man, or most men, are risk averse. I would rather say that there seems to be a good case 
for arguing that man is loss averse, which is not exactly the same thing as being risk averse. 
The rationale for concentrating on loss aversion is a real one: there is an asymmetry in the 
effects of spells of deficient and abundant consumption. You cannot simply make up for 
spells of deficient consumption by future abundant consumption. In other words, there are  
serious welfare losses in real wage variations. It has been demonstrated that price stability 
generates an increase in survival chances in a population. This is now a well established result 
in the economics of famine literature.10  Stable consumption as opposed to variability also 
saves the population from the irreversible effects of spells of poverty, which can manifest 
themselves in permanent stunting, which is also known to be correlated with life expectancy. 
I deliberately focus on local harvest shocks because throughout most of history, markets were 
segmented and driven by supply shocks rather than demand shocks. Demand for food was 
income inelastic: changes in income had little effect on demand. Small supply shocks 
generated large price movements because demand for food is price inelastic, i.e. small 
changes in harvest generate large inverse reactions in prices. 
  
In food markets local shocks, if unmediated by the global economy, were often a much 
greater problem than global shocks, simply because the latter were small, at least in 
proportional terms. Since antiquity observers have demonstrated the point that the global 
economy eases the impact of local natural accidents. Aristotle made the point in reference to 
the Mediterranean economy indicating that local shocks cancelled out in this vast area 
because natural accidents were not common to the entire area, that is climatic variations were 
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10 See M. Ravallion, Markets and Famines, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1988. 
inter-regionally independent. Hence global supply was not much affected although local 
output varied a lot from region to region. Others have since refined this argument. The French 
Physiocrats made it the cornerstone of their spirited defence for free inter-regional and 
international trade in grain in the 1760s.11 Even if they were not proven right in their own 
lifetime their analysis was essentially correct. Look at this grain price series from the city of 
Toulouse, in southern France. 
 
Figure 4. Price  (in logs) of wheat, Toulouse, 1490-1590 and 1825-1913. 
 
 
Source: K.G. Persson, Grain Markets in Europe1500-1900, Integration and Deregulation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 107 
 
Figure 4 shows the prices of wheat for an early modern period and for the industrial 
breakthrough in the 19th century. Prices are expressed in logs so you see proportional 
variations in price. This seems to be the right way of expressing price volatility. Assume for 
simplicity that nominal wages have increased – probably with a lag - with the trend increase 
in food prices so that real wages remain the same.  If so what we should look at is 
proportional changes in price because, say, a ten per cent change in price will have the same 
effect on real wages independently of the nominal level of prices and wages. What you see is 
a dramatic decline in price volatility of prices from the hundred-year period starting at the end 
of the 15th century compared to the hundred-year period starting in the beginning of the 19th 
century. In Figure 5 we trace the decline in variance expressed as the standard deviation of 
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11  This section draws heavily on my Grain Markets in Europe1500-1900, Integration and Deregulation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
the residual in a random walk model. There is a steady decline from the late Middle Ages 
until the end of the 19th century. Variance declines almost to a third of its initial level over the 
years. This pattern is not unique for Toulouse in France but is seen in most of Europe in this 
period. 
 
Figure 5. Standard deviation of the residual in a random-walk model of monthly wheat 
prices, Toulouse, 1500-1900, recursive estimation. Per cent = 100 times the number on 
the vertical axis. 
 
 
Source: K.G. Persson, Grain Markets in Europe1500-1900, Integration and Deregulation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 109. 
 
What’s driving this improvement in market performance ( it is an improvement because price 
volatility causes distress and social hardship) is not that local harvest shocks were becoming 
smaller over time but that the Toulouse market had been integrated in the national and 
international market so that the effect of local supply shocks had been neutralized.  
 
There are two aspects of price volatility worth discussing at some length:  the seasonal pattern 
and the long term evolution and the two aspects will be discussed in that order. 
There is one peculiar thing with most agricultural goods that stands out in a comparison with 
other commodities and that is that grain or potatoes or apples are produced once a year and 
consumed over the entire year. We know that these goods were held as stocks over the year 
and we would expect that markets honoured those who invested in inventories by allowing an 
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economic return. Let us for a moment abstract from carry-over from one harvest to another. If 
so, the price of grain should increase at a constant rate over the year reflecting the interest rate 
and rental cost for storage.12  However, the seasonal pattern looks more like that  in Figure 6 
below. Prices are at a low point immediately after the harvest and then rise until the end of the 
year. After that price patterns are less predictable as suggested by the graph indicating a 
variety of trajectories. 
 
Figure 6. Observed seasonal pattern of grain prices. 
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equilibrium: a prologue to the theory of speculation, 
obvious parallel here to the habit of holding money as cash. Cash does not yield any return. 
But people hold cash and  non interest bearing cashable deposits. The reason they do that is of 
course that the liquidity services provided by cash are greater than the interest forgone by 
holding money as cash. Stocks of grain provide the holder a sort of precautionary service, that 
of being able to maintain a stable consumption level independently of future prices. It is 
perhaps reasonable to invoke loss aversion behind the precautionary sentiment and there is 
probably some customary element in this behaviour as well. 
 
Let us now turn to price volatility from one harvest year to another. Following the argument 
suggested by Aristotle and the Physiocrats just reviewed,  there were great prospects for price 
stabilizing intererregional and international trade between excess and deficient markets. 
However, if transport costs were high, markets were necessarily segmented locally or 
regionally, so price had to rise significantly before the costs of long-distance supply were 
covered. The fall in transport costs and in marketing costs contributed to the decline in price 
volatility in the long run. But with high transport costs and inefficient marketing, local shocks 
were necessarily associated with large price movements in the absence of inter-temporal 
speculative storage, so called carry-over. Carry-over storage, which in a sense is an inter-
temporal ‘transport’ of commodities from one year to another, can reduce price volatility but 
there are natural constraints to the  storage of food. Potatoes, for example, cannot be carried 
over from one year to another and grain has a storage life limited to a few years, the precise 
length depends on climate and the sophistication of granary technology. A humid climate,  
like that prevailing in northern Europe, made distilling grain to aquait a safe way of storing 
the caloric content, although there were some side-effects of excessive intake of these calories 
of course.  
Economic historians have debated the extent and nature of grain storage and whether markets 
provided efficient storage or not. The precise documentation is very unreliable or lacking 
altogether so scholars have relied on indirect evidence. The fact that underlying harvest 
shocks seem to be uncorrelated over time, while there is significant autocorrelation of prices, 
has led quite a few historians to the premature conclusion that profit maximizing grain storage 
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Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,79,181-219, 1957. 
ruled the grain markets.13 The idea is that inventory adjustments generated auto-correlation 
in supply, and hence in price, despite uncorrelated harvest outcomes. However, it turns out 
that an element of auto-correlation is present in practically all price series of storable  as well 
as non-storable goods. I am sceptical about attempts to derive profit-maximizing storage 
strategies from price behaviour and observed price patterns. Most attempts are based on poor 
econometrics. If you argue that there was profit-maximising storage you have to decide what 
expectations traders held about future prices. Some economic historians suggest that people 
somehow  implicitly know the true or best model available to a modern econometrician.  The 
problem is, however, that there is not a satisfactory model available. A trend-stationary 
representation of the price movements, meaning that prices varied but reverted to trend, can 
motivate inventory adjustments if prices are expected to revert to trend. (Fill the granary when 
the price is below trend in the expectation that prices will increase. Sell when the price is 
above trend in expectation that prices will fall). But it turns out that a  trend stationary model 
has poor predictive power. An obvious alternative, a random walk model  - price today is 
equal to price tomorrow - is not much better. However, profit-maximizing carry-over storage 
has no economic rationale in a random walk model since the innovations in the series are 
random with a zero mean suggesting zero profits from speculative hoarding. I am inclined to 
suggest that carry-over was directed by some rule of thumb – or customary precautionary 
motive – such that you carry over in good years and use the stored grain when the harvest is 
insufficient. This is not to say that the rule of thumb strategy is irrational. In fact you save 
both effort and time by not trying to predict future price movements and readjust your 
inventories in line with endless reassessments of future prices. A rule of thumb strategy, as 
just outlined, also generates autocorrelation in prices.14  
 
Some specialised traders were involved in speculative carry over but my impression is that it 
was not sufficient to generate the desired level of price stability. It can be argued that there is 
an intrinsic market failure involved here. Price volatility generates negative externalities such 
as increased incidence of epidemics, petty crime and social disintegration. You can rephrase 
                                                          
13 An influential but not very convincing paper in this tradition is D.N. McCloskey and J. Nash, Corn at an 
interest: the extent and cost of grain storage in Medieval England, American Economic Review, 74, 1, pp. 174-
87,1984.See also R. Nielsen, Storage and English government intervention in early modern grain markets, 
Journal of Economic History,57,1,1-33,1997. 
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14  See  M. Ejrnæs and K.G .Persson, Grain storage in Early Modern Europe, Journal of Economic History, l 
59,.3, 1999, pp.762-72. 
this insight by stating that there is a public good nature in price stability. While private 
storage might stabilize prices, speculators are motivated and rewarded by private gains. 
However, there is no way they can capture privately the social gains from price stability and 
therefore markets will not be sufficient. Whether the public authorities were better providers 
of price stability than markets is a controversial issue To settle the issue of the efficiency of 
pre-industrial grain market regulation regulated and a non-regulated markets need to be 
compared while hoping that all other things were equal. The French Physiocrats suggested 
that the unregulated 18th   century English market was less volatile than regulated Continental 
markets. A closer analysis does not support their claim, however. I looked into a number of 
late 17th and early 18th century Continental markets and compared price volatility with 
London. It turned out that London was the most volatile with only one Continental market, 
Toulouse having the same level of volatility while Pisa, Vienna and Cologne had lower levels 
of price disturbances. Not only was price volatility lower in Cologne, but bread price 
volatility was lower than the volatility of the main input as is demonstrated in Figure 7. This 
was the result of deliberate public policy by which bakers, who were probably less vulnerable 
than the very poor, were not permitted to increase bread prices in line with the increase in 
prices of inputs. What they lost in crises years they gained in affluent years by not lowering 
prices proportionally to the fall in grain prices.  
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Figure 7. Residual variation of bread prices as a percentage of the residual variation in 
rye prices, Cologne, 1660-1760. Variance of the price of rye =100. 
  
 
Source: K.G. Persson, The seven lean years, elasticity traps and intervention in grain markets 
in pre-industrial Europe, Economic History Review, XLIV, 4, 1996, p.707. 
 
Before leaving the discussion of price volatility it is worth pointing out as a way of summing 
up, that market performance has improved considerably by reducing price volatility in the 
very long run. There is no doubt that the spatial integration of markets has been the prime 
mover but it has not only been the integration of single commodities but also the increase in 
the available close substitutes as diets have become more varied. Governments retreated 
gradually from intervention in European grain markets from the late 18th century or early  19th 
century, and wisely so. Market integration had reduced price volatility to levels not 
experienced before. Government intervention had become obsolete. 
 
Let us now widen the discussion concerning an appropriate standard of market performance. 
In a single market we are concerned about the extent to which local outcomes, local market 
power and harvest shocks drive prices and hence consumption possibilities. But the extent of 
local independence is a matter of market integration. A local monopoly will dwindle if the 
local market is integrated in the larger economy. And as pointed out already, the impact of 
local harvest shocks will be small. The spatial relationship between markets therefore tells us 
a lot about the nature of the local market. The basic standard by which spatial exchange is 
evaluated is the transport and transaction cost adjusted law of one price, the law of one price 
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for short. 15The equilibrium price differential between two markets for a homogenous good 
must not exceed the transport and transaction costs involved in moving the goods between 
them. If price differentials are larger there are profit opportunities not exploited by traders so 
markets cannot be efficient.  It is sometimes but not always possible to estimate a stable price 
differential between markets as far back in history as the early modern period. The fact that 
there is an equilibrium price differential does not prove that it is efficient. In fact it is not until 
comparatively late in history that equilibrium price differentials between markets also become 
efficient ones. Market efficiency seems to be a fairly recent phenomenon in history. The 
other important issue is to investigate how often pairs of markets are out of their particular 
equilibrium, efficient or not. The short answer to that question is: most of the time. 
However, that does not make this equilibrium concept a meaningless one. But it should not be 
understood as a state in which economies actually rest rather  as an attractor. An attractor   
absorbs deviations from the law of one price, that is, it ensures that shocks do not become 
permanent but just transitory. There are two aspects of great importance here. First, the 
strength of the attractor, which can be measured by the speed at which a shock is neutralized. 
And the second aspect is related to the nature of the equilibrium. Is the equilibrium really 
compatible with the transport and transaction cost adjusted law of one price? If it is, we can 
say that the equilibrium is an efficient one in the sense that all opportunities for gains from 
trade and arbitrage have been exploited. If not, markets are imperfect. I will discuss the nature 
of these equilibria in due course. First, however, I will look at adjustment speed back to 
equilibrium and how it has developed over the centuries. 
The basic idea and the dramatic change over time is shown in Figure 8. 
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15  See M. Ejrnæs and K.G. Persson, Market integration and transport costs in France 1825-1903: A threshold 
error correction approach to the law of one price, Explorations in Economic History, 37,2000, pp149-73, for a 
discussion of  the stability and adjustment to the law of one price. 
Figure 8. The evolution of adjustment speed between long-distance markets, 1730-1925 
 
Source: M. Ejrnæs and K.G. Persson, work in progress, price data from K. G. Persson “Mind 
the gap”: Transport cost and price convergence in the 19th century, mimeo Institute of 
Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1002:02. See footnote 16 for a reference to method 
and measurement. 
 
We are looking at pairs of markets in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, of which the 18th 
century pair is typical for the Early Modern Period. Each pair is initially in an attractor type 
equilibrium in the sense that deviations, so-called errors, are corrected for.16 But we cannot 
yet say whether that equilibrium is an efficient one, that is whether it is actually the transport 
cost adjusted law of one price equilibrium. Price differences are, however, at some stable long 
term ratio. Imagine now a shock to the price in one of the markets of, say, ten per cent. The 
two markets are now in dis-equilibrium. Since the equilibrium is interpreted as an attractor, 
prices will adjust, possibly in both markets, although not necessarily at the same speed.  The 
equilibrium will be attained but at a different level of prices than before the shock.  The figure 
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shows that the speed of adjustment is increasing significantly and dramatically over time. A 
convenient way of expressing speed of adjustment is to measure the half-life of a shock, that 
is the time it takes for markets to get half  way back to equilibrium. It is about 18 months in 
the 18th century, the Pisa (Italy) and Ruremonde (Netherlands) pair of markets, but is reduced 
to about a week in the 20th century, cf. the Winnipeg and Liverpool pair. By the middle of the 
19th century – before the Atlantic cable - the adjustment speed between New York and 
London corresponds to a half life of the shock of a little less than a month. You can now 
easily see the link between price volatility and segmentation of markets. If markets are poorly 
integrated, local shocks can have strong and long lasting effects on prices as demonstrated by 
the long half-life of the shock. In an integrated market local shocks can only have short 
transitory effects. On the other hand the integrated economy is more vulnerable to global 
shocks. If global shocks are fairly small in proportional terms relative to local shocks, 
integration of markets helps to stabilize prices over time. When price volatility decreased in 
Toulouse, cf. Figures 4 and 5 above, it was accompanied by faster adjustment to shocks, 
including global shocks.  
What forces generated the spectacular increase in the speed of adjustment to shocks? The 
main factors are developments in information and transport technology. Before the telegraph, 
which was introduced in the middle of the 18th century, goods and information travelled at 
about the same speed.  After that information travelled by the hour and the commercial press 
diffused the information within 24 hours. A much more sophisticated and transparent trading 
network developed as a consequence. Unexploited profit opportunities did not remain 
unexploited.   In an economy with inventory adjustments the news of a price increase in 
London was enough to send prices up in New York and Chicago instantaneously.  In that 
sense commodity markets began to behave very much like asset markets. 
 
We have talked a lot about equilibrium without saying much about what that equilibrium 
really is, apart from suggesting that the transport cost adjusted law of one price must serve as 
a standard with which to judge it. The question now must be posed whether the estimated 
equilibrium is an efficient one, that is, whether it is compatible with the transport cost 
adjusted law of one price. Let us look at the price of a well specified variety of wheat, say 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16  The analysis generating the results in Figure 8 is an error correction model, which indicates that the prices in 
the pair of markets are co-integrated. That means, roughly speaking, that prices in the two markets are 
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Red Western, in two markets, for example New York (exporter) and London (importer). 
The following identity states the problem precisely: 
 
Residual = Price in London – (Price in New York + T&T) 
 
T&T means transport and transaction costs between and in ports, including insurance, port 
charges etc. In efficient trade the residual should be zero. Please, note that the word residual 
differs from the word residual (meaning error) in Figures 2 and 5 and the discussion relating 
to these figures. The residual is, in a sense, a measure of the extent of market inefficiency or 
poor market performance. In history a zero residual seems to have been attained as a 
consequence of a very long historical process of improved market performance as is indicated 
in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Residual price difference in transatlantic wheat trade, 1855-1925. Per cent of 
New York price. 
Period 1855-1858 1860-1864 1878-1885 1892-1900 1921-1925 
Price differential 
in percent  
8.15 13.05 3.15 3.35 -0.1 
Note: Price difference refers to New York – London, except for 1921-1925, which refers to 
Winnipeg-Liverpool 
Source: M. Ejrnæs and K. G. Persson, work in progress, price data from K. G. Persson “Mind 
the gap”: Transport cost and price convergence in the 19th century, mimeo Institute of 
Economics, University of Copenhagen 2002:02 and ‘Price spreads and shipment costs in the 
wheat export trade of Canada, Wheat Studies, 2, 5, 1926, pp.177-202. The estimates are 
transport cost adjusted equilibria from which port charges and insurance costs have been 
subtracted. 
 
The estimates are based on price and T&T costs for transatlantic wheat markets and we find a 
considerable reduction in the residual from some 15 per cent in 1855-64 to 3.5 per cent by the 
end of the 19th century and finally zero only in 1921- 25.  In all  cases it has been possible to 
establish the existence of an equilibrium attractor but it has not been a law of one price 
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‘shadowing’ each other, i.e. that they are related by some constant ratio.   
equilibrium until the residual price differential was down to zero, that is by the 1920s. So the 
law of one price has not really been the rule in the long history of the market economy until 
recently. It is clear that the decline in the residual is of a non-trivial magnitude and it 
compares well with the decline in tariffs and transport costs. The 15 per cent residual for the 
1855-58 period can be taken as a reasonable approximation of  pre-telegraph long distance 
trade.  However the economic benefits of the improvements in market efficiency, as 
demonstrated by the reduction in the residual, have been ignored, probably by the 
presumption of economists and historians alike that markets, if they exist, perform fairly well. 
History shows, however that institutions can be stable and long-lived without being  efficient. 
 
3.3. Property relations and land holding 
As the market case indicated, we should not rush to strong conclusions about the efficiency 
characteristic of an institution just  because it is  stable and has a long history. When it comes 
to the market institution we are inclined to think that it thrives, despite its shortcomings, 
because it is better than conceivable alternatives. However when we analyse property 
relations we are more pessimistic. The contractual setting where parties define and defend 
their own interests can entail different bargaining strengthes and the institutional outcome will 
reflect that. We noted in the Introduction that the social disorder in the post Roman world 
fostered institutions that were not necessarily helpful to economic growth. Security was a 
precious thing and the common people were willing to give up rights, including personal 
freedoms and property rights, to get protection from armed men. Now this means that the 
future  bargaining power of groups differed and it might influence the institutional evolution 
and growth potential of the economy. In the early medieval period, up to 1200, serfdom was 
widespread in Europe, although not as widespread as believed previously.17 Along with  the 
manorial sector manned by serfs  there were independent peasants as well as leaseholders 
working the land. Markets in land and labour therefore co-existed in the early medieval 
period alongside customary relations, although the latter were gradually replaced by market 
relations.  
Serfdom differs from slavery in that serfs were not traded as goods, as slaves were. Rather  
                                                          
17  The relative size of the tenant farmed agriculture is difficult to assess precisely, because we mostly have 
records relating to the seigniorial sector, that is the land directly managed by landlords or their representatives. 
However in England already by  1086 about 2/3 of the area was cultivated by tenants and a small free peasantry 
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serfs were tied to a lord, a landowner or someone who had land owned by the crown as a fief. 
The latter case reflected the fragility of the central authority in the medieval period. The King 
had difficulties in collecting taxes and rent and delegated it to lords. Since land was the major 
taxable property and since it could not be physically moved, we understand easily that 
territorial conflicts were endemic in these centuries. Lords became warlords. The 
distinguishing characteristic of serfdom was the limitation to labour mobility and the labour 
services the serf owed to the lord. The serfs typically lived with others in villages were they 
cultivated land on a family basis. The lord was entitled to a rent for the use of that land which 
was paid in terms of labour services performed at the estate, the manor of the lord. This 
practice had its problems. Work motivation on the manor was low as often is the case with 
forced labour, so work effort had to be supervised. Maintenance of tools was often neglected, 
and lords reacted by demanding that peasants  use their own draught animals and ploughs 
when working at the manor. Furthermore work sometimes had to be performed when labour 
was needed on the plots of land that the serfs cultivated on their own and since village and 
estate were separated physically, much time was spent in moving between village and estate, 
sometimes with draught animals. So why do we have this peculiar institution of paying rent? 
There is one argument that stresses the poorly monetized economy in this period, which made 
payments in labour services convenient. But this argument is not really valid. If money was 
scarce and if transactions were often direct barter, the rent could obviously be paid in kind, 
say, as an amount of rye or wheat or butter. The clue to the understanding of serfdom lies 
elsewhere.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
but that proportion increased over time. See ch.3 in B.M.S. Campbell, English seigniorial agriculture,1250-1450, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2000. 
 
 35 
The origin of the institution can be traced back to the Post-Roman world when land was 
plentiful and labour was scarce. In a sense it was an open frontier type of situation.18 Since 
rent is the scarcity premium on land, it did not have one given the abundance of land in that 
historical period. Labour could move towards the frontier and escape from rent, that is it 
could earn the entire product of its labour being at least as productive as labour on the lord=s 
estate.  If labourers were free to move, they could bargain credibly with lords and bid up 
wages so that landowners could not extract rent from free labour. However, by restricting the 
freedom of mobility, labour could not exploit its bargaining power.  There is an obvious 
parallel here to slave labour in pre-civil war North-America. Southern land-owners could not 
attract free labour from Europe, since immigrants could get land almost free at the western 
frontier. They therefore had to use ‘un-free’ labour. 
This brings us to the issue in the introductory remarks, that is : was the labour service -estate 
organization of agricultural production really efficient? To answer that question we must have 
some plausible alternative which can serve as a standard. In fact, that alternative developed 
when population increased and increased demand for land. Land now got a scarcity premium. 
The balance of bargaining power had shifted to landowners, who could bargain a rent from 
land hungry peasants and they could do it through market transactions without relying on 
force. Free labour was willing to pay a rent to use land, because the there was no more free 
land at the frontier or because the available free land was of low quality and generated low 
yields. With the increase in demand for land, serfdom disappeared in most parts of Western 
Europe beginning in the 12th and continuing in the 13th centuries. Landowners could rely on 
markets to extract land rent.  Peasants now valued rights to remain on the land they tilled and 
asked for and  often got hereditary rights to lease land. Rents were increasingly paid in cash 
instead of hard to monitor labour dues.  
Did this type of agriculture perform better? We believe so. There are a priori grounds for this 
belief apart from empirical evidence. Household production or self-employment in general  
saves on costs of supervision since labour is self-monitoring. Legal contracts also developed 
so that leaseholds became hereditary, which stimulated leaseholders to invest in land 
improvements, buildings  and equipment. The abolition of serfdom first developed near the 
cities were land was scarce and rents high and in areas where land-reclamation was possible 
                                                          
18  The theory outlined in the next paragraphs can be traced back to Turgot  but a modern coherent formulations 
is found in E. Domar,The causes of slavery  or serfdom, Journal of Economic History,1970, pp.18-32.  
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and landlords had little or weak authority. This fact makes it difficult for us to disentangle the 
growth promoting effects of the vicinity of markets and  the ‘pure’ effects of freedom. What 
we can register, however, is that the peasantry was quick to exploit market opportunities, 
when free to do so, in terms of product differentiation and specialization.  Cities demanded 
not only a wide variety of food and vegetables but also crops for industrial use, such as flax 
and plants for dying cloth. This helped to intensify land use and stimulated more sophisticated 
rotation schemes, i.e. the order of crops grown on a piece of land over a sequence of years. 
Rotation schemes should ideally restore the quality of land and the vicinity of cities made 
human nightsoil a much valued fertilizer and a substitute for animal dung. There is a clear 
correlation between freedom and sophistication in Pre-Black Death agriculture, for example, 
there is evidence that the superior traction power provided by horses, as compared to oxen, 
was first tried by free peasants and that also provided them with the means to get to market 
towns at a faster speed.  
Predictably the dramatic labour scarcity after the Black Death when a third or more of 
population vanished, made landlords try to re-introduce serfdom, without much success this 
time since peasants had now gained a legal position they were not prepared to surrender if not 
forced to. There were exceptions, the so-called second serfdom in Eastern Europe, much 
discussed but little understood. Some look at it as the inevitable outcome of increased 
commercialization when Eastern Europe, where the second serfdom prevailed, began to 
supply Western Europe with grain. However, the highly commercialized Western European  
agriculture did not see a similar development - with the  exception of the introduction of  
vornedskab  in Denmark, which incidentally was triggered off by labour shortages after the 
disastrous wars with neighbouring Sweden. Labour shortages and the bargaining power of the 
peasantry seem to have been the decisive factors, with shortages combined with a weak 
peasantry signalling the reinstitution  or persistence of serfdom. Where markets in land and 
labour were already well developed, there was little chance for landlords to re-introduce 
serfdom. Furthermore, there is no case where sophisticated, high-yielding agriculture has 
developed with serfdom in Europe. Where it remained, such as was the case in Russia until 
the mid 19th century, it was associated with technological stagnation and extreme poverty. 
The emanicipation of the peasantry in Germany and Denmark the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries was also linked to significant labour productivity growth. The important lesson from 
the Medieval transition from serfdom to freedom seems to be that long-lasting institutions can 
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actually prevent resources and opportunities being fully exploited, not permanently but for 
centuries. 
 
Let us now turn our attention to another puzzling institution in pre-industrial agriculture 
which many observers have looked at as inherently inefficient. Up until the end of the 18th 
century peasants cultivated land on a family basis but the organisation of household produc-
tion was highly dependent on the other members of the village. Members of the village 
community shared common land used for collecting wood for fuel, hunting - if the lord 
permitted- and for grazing livestock. The cultivated land was organized according the so-
called open field system in which each household had strips of land scattered around the 
village. These narrow strips ran alongside strips of other households with no fences separating 
the land of different families. The structure of landholding imposed restrictions on the use of 
land, what to grow, when to harvest, when to put the land in fallow. Open-field agriculture 
was widespread in Europe and was not abolished until the 18th and 19th centuries when 
households could consolidate their holdings and privatize and split the common.19 In Map 1 
below, the lay-out of holdings in the Danish village of Årslev is shown before and after the 
enclosure. There were 14 households in all and the strips of one of them is marked by bold 
lines scattered all over the village in 108 strips. After enclosures and consolidation of 
holdings, half of the households remain at the centre but with direct access to the consolidated 
land. The size of the chequered holding was 26 ha. The remaining households moved to their 
holdings on the outskirts of the village.   
 
Map 1 Årslev before and after consolidation of the scattered fields. 
                                                          
19  There are a few exceptions. In the early 1960s I spent a week at a farmhouse near 
Chartres, west of Paris,where the farmer complained bitterly about the fact that he had his 
holdings scattered all around the village in what looked like an old-fashioned open field 
village. 
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Source: Danmarks historie,1700-1800, pp. 73, 271. 
 
 
What was the rationale for this organization of landholding? Economic historians, unlike 
historians who look for the origin of the system believing that it explains it, thereby revealing 
an extreme belief in the importance of path dependence, try to look for some efficiency 
characteristic in what seemingly is a very inefficient system: think about the time it takes to 
transport men and  equipment from one strip to another.  There is no consensus about the 
rationality of open field agriculture but most explanations see it as a way of coping with risk. 
If natural accidents, which were difficult to control and sometimes affected agriculture 
disastrously, were local, the scattering of holdings made it likely that a household with bad 
luck in one part of the village had better luck in some other part. So the consequences of 
natural accidents were more evenly spread among village members. Furthermore the quality 
of land might differ and scattering of land then made an equitable distribution of land 
qualities possible. But this interpretation is open to intriguing questions. There is not an 
inevitable drift in societies towards equitable distribution of resources, rather the other way 
around. So why should these villages necessarily try to accomplish it? One possible answer 
lies in what we can call team externalities. Villages were typically rather small and isolated. 
The smallness and isolation mean that there is great mutual dependence between members. If 
someone is shirking or performs poorly, it has great consequences for others. Village 
members were all dependent on each other because markets were poorly integrated. If your 
own fate depends on the efforts of others, and vice versa, then strong cohesion in the group 
might be necessary. This type of mutual dependence or solidarity is easier to accomplish in 
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groups, that share economic conditions.20  Depriving some members in the village access to 
portions of the best land might not be in the long run interest of members. This interpretation 
incidentally helps to explain the system of scattered holdings. In a village in which your own 
fate is dependent on the behaviour of others, you would typically encounter moral hazard. 
Village members might make claims for support from others but you need to know whether 
they are legitimate or not. Is, for example, the failed crop of a household due to negligence or 
to natural accidents? You need to know, because it is important in the long run that only 
legitimate claims on resources, i.e. crop failures not controlled by the household, are met. If 
not the village will find itself in a situation in which those who work hard support those who 
shirk, and given the unyielding environment, this is not compatible with the long run survival 
of the village members. Generally speaking, in small economies poorly integrated into the 
larger economy, the mutual dependence of fellow members is greater and by implication the 
need for control of individual behaviour is also greater. This is a clue to why freedom seems 
to be prevailing in large organizations: the potential impact of a single individual on your 
welfare is very small.    Open-field agriculture actually provides a solution to the moral 
hazard problem because it provides the members in the village with a supervision strategy: 
The lay-out of holdings make supervision a by-product of work since a high degree of 
simultaneity in activities are called for.  
The other potential inefficiency in open field agriculture is the role of the common. In the 
literature this is known as the alleged A tragedy of the common@. Economic theory suggests 
that common property is over exploited because the single user only equates marginal benefits 
in its use with private marginal costs and neglects the social costs or the costs to others. We 
encountered this problem when discussing overpopulation above, see footnote  8. The logic is 
                                                          
20By  contrast, in a large modern society you can be indifferent, and often are, to the 
fate of  your neighbour because her fate does not have an impact on your economic  well-
being. If your neighbour is laid off and is eligible for welfare benefits you will not be worried 
as a taxpayer because the effect on your tax bill is negligible. You might be emotionally 
attached to your neighbour and worry about her being unemployed, well you should, but that 
is another matter. 
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this: if an extended household needs more wood for fuel, it has to increase it marginal effort 
to find a given amount of fuel because a phase of deforestation is eventually reached. Now 
this increased marginal effort forms part of the household=s constraints and might in fact 
restrain its appetite for wood somewhat. Nonetheless, that particular household will neglect 
that it has also imposed a higher marginal effort (cost) on other households in their use of the 
common property. This is the simple story of over-exploitation of common resources, that is 
the neglect of the external effect and we face it currently in the depletion of our fishing 
waters. 
Was the tragedy of the common a major problem in pre-industrial economiesBy estimating 
rents and land values Greg Clark (of Davis-California)  suggests that pre-enclosure land had a 
very low price but when land became scarce it was simply privatized.  
Other reasons for the long life of common property might be that access to the common was 
restricted by rules and conventions which stopped overexploitation. Howver, when or if these 
conventions break down or are not adhered to serious problems occur as can be seen from the 
 deforestation in some parts of Africa where the free access to forests for fuel has had and 
continues to have  serious negative external effects. 
The set of institutions discussed in the preceding paragraphs were transformed from the 18th 
century onwards. The enclosure movement in England privatized the common and land 
holdings became consolidated all over Europe by the late 18th and early 19th century in 
Scandinavia. Why was the old system abolished? We will return to that question in the next 
section. 
 
4. A new interpretation of pre-industrial growth. 
Let us now suggest a foundation for an interpretation of the long term evolution of income 
and population in Europe. This new view acknowledges diminishing returns in agriculture as 
population grows but we also explicitly acknowledge technological change, new knowledge, 
and furthermore there are Smithian forces of division of labour stimulated by <the extent of 
the market=. If we have fixed resources but technological change (which Malthus sometimes 
did not exclude), the story will become fundamentally different. Technological growth is 
present if we can produce more goods today than were produced yesterday, with resources 
used in production held constant. If we stick to the Malthusian idea that the rate of population 
growth is positively associated with per capita income, then the existence of technological 
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growth suggests the possibility of regimes that combine a specific rate of technological 
change and a specific constant level of income. A higher rate of technological change would 
enable the economy to leap to a higher level of permanent income and population growth 
despite diminishing returns. (The argument  is developed in Appendix 1). The intuition here is 
that the effects of diminishing returns is offset by technological change This view seems 
compatible with what we see in the period, say 800 to 1350, and after 1450. But it is obvious 
that we have a regime change during the Industrial Revolution, which, in this perspective, 
must be interpreted as being driven by a shift in the rate of permanent technological progress 
and generating income on a higher permanent level. As will be argued in section 7 income 
growth in the early phase of the Industrial Revolution was quite modest. 
Can we also explain why societies remain in low income equilibrium despite not seeming to 
be constrained by limited natural resources, for example, after the decline of the Roman 
empire? To do this we must introduce the (Adam) Smithian vision of a specific force of 
productivity growth, the division of labour, increasing returns to market. The division of 
labour is limited by the extent of the market, as Adam Smith expressed it. The extent of the 
market is basically the number and purchasing power of buyers whose demand sellers can 
satisfy. The larger the extent of the market,the finer can the division of labour become. The 
social saving in division of labour rests on indivisibilities in training (learning) and equip-
ment. If you devote some time to training, you can increase your efficiency but some 
minimum level of demand for the product is needed so that the time spent in training can be 
paid off. A similar argument applies to indivisibilities in tools and equipment needed to 
enhance productivity in a specialized  activity. The very concentration of a producer on a 
limited number of tasks will enhance learning of perfection, but again, of course, these 
economies of repetition will depend on the size of the market. The extent of the market might 
differ at any point in time among sellers depending of what they sell. Luxuries can travel far, 
heavy goods with low prices cannot. The extent of the market is dependent on population 
density, and from that perspective population growth is a good thing as long as it does not 
reduce income due to strong diminishing returns. It is also stimulated by falling transport cost 
but if law and order breaks down, then transport and trade become too risky and costly and 
the extent of the market shrinks. That is why political and legal order matter since without 
order, market networks cannot operate. It now turns out that the  Post-Roman decline 
involved both population decline and the break-down of law and order. Despite the fact there 
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were no resource constraints in agriculture, that is no diminishing returns, an economy  
nevertheless got down into a cumulative declining income spiral only because the gains from 
division of labour were lost when the extent of the market shrunk. This is, we suggest, what 
happened in the troubled centuries before the resurgence of Europe in the 8th, 9th  and   10th   
centuries.  
The forces that got the European economy out of its low-level equilibrium with non-ex-
hausted opportunities were mainly exogenous, such as the fact that the disease environment 
became less aggressive, permitting population to increase again. But we also need to stress 
the fact that the re-establishment of social and political order diminished transaction costs in 
economic intercourse and more generally by extended market networks. Both factors 
permitted the extent of the market to increase. As long as diminishing returns in agriculture 
were weak, growth could continue forever because of the ever-increasing division of labour. 
But the fate of this economy is that it will ultimately encounter diminishing returns. 
Continued population growth is then possible only if there is technological change. The 
intuition here is that while technological growth is a permanent factor, the division of labour 
only generates a one off effect on labour productivity, which eventually will be eroded by 
diminishing returns. The perspective outlined here can discern different trend growth rates of 
population.21 The Malthusian stagnation with a zero rate of population growth with income at 
subsistence level  is just a special case. More in line with the historical record are regimes 
combining a specific rate of population growth and an associated  above subsistence  income. 
However, the observed  periods of stagnating population need not be ‘Malthusian’ at all. In 
fact, after the decline of the Roman empire one cannot speak about binding constraints at all, 
yet the income remained at lower levels than before the decline. However the combination of 
low population density and social disorder made transactions so risky and expensive that it 
did not invite people to risk investments in skills or trade, given the fact that these 
investments have an element of indivisibility. There were, in other words, non-exhausted 
opportunities because of institutional failures. 
In the simple framework outlined above, the higher the rate of growth of technological 
change, the higher the constant per capita income and the rate of population growth, diminish-
                                                          
21 This section relies heavily on my book Pre-industrial Economic Growth, 
Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1988. 
 
 43 
ing returns held constant. Smithian division of labour alone cannot, however, assure sustained 
economic growth if limited resources generate diminishing returns. Technological change is 
essential for sustained growth but Smithian forces might be decisive for taking an economy 
out of its low-level equilibrium. But what about that decisive component in sustained growth, 
technological progress, is it exogenous or endogenous? The conditions that generate new path 
breaking knowledge, as opposed to applied scientific research, are still little known. 
It is worth pointing out that innovations are not just about technologies but also about the 
organization of production and its institutional setting. The transformation of land-use is one  
Important example. What caused it? 
We have hinted at one explanation already : the increasing population from the 18th century 
increased land prices and  the common became a valuable asset. Poor peasants often opposed 
this transformation because they relied more on common resources but to little avail because  
now the equitable drift we identified in Mediaeval and Early modern villages was under 
stress. Again a WHY? is warranted. Here is a possible answer: Markets had now became 
much more integrated and sophisticated, and offered opportunities and insurance against risk 
if not for all at least for some, and among the Asome@ we find those with economic and 
political resources. For example, crop differentiation became  a way of coping with natural 
accidents because different crops reacted differently to the same exogenous shock. But crop 
differentiation is possible only in well integrated economies. Furthermore market integration 
also means more competition  in credit markets, and credit markets now offered help when 
income failed but with non-usurious interest rates, although there was probably differential 
access to credit with the poor still facing higher interest rates. The important general lesson is 
this: market integration makes the economy larger and by consequence, the importance of any 
single individual becomes smaller. You are permitted larger freedom because your  actions do 
not have significant effects on others. The peculiar redistribution, control and supervision 
structure of the old order has become redundant and the integrated large economy permits 
much more freedom for individuals. Liberalism is about to enter centre stage. 
 
5. Growth of output and per capita income in the pre-industrial economy. 
Aggregate output varied with population and labour productivity. There is a belief that per 
capita income was largely stagnant during long stretches of pre-industrial history. That 
implies that technological change was insignificant or just about matched the forces of 
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diminishing returns. However, as was suggested above, a technological shift  to a 
permanently higher rate would make it possible for an economy to reach a higher steady state 
level of per capita income. Can we actually say anything about the pace of economic growth 
before the industrial revolution? And is it possible to show that there was systematic 
technological progress? Yes, we can but we need to be cautious. In fact, output and 
productivity estimates before 1900 are quite fragile and it is only after 1945 that a large 
number of countries adopted modern national income accounting. But even today with 
sophisticated data collection methods, real output  estimates are subject to large margins of 
uncertainty because there is no ideal way of constructing price deflators and to account  for 
new goods and quality improvements. Different methods used currently can give results that  
suggest deviations from the standard estimate of, say, a third. 
 
Traditional growth accounting has not been used much in analysis of pre-industrial econo-
mies. Growth accounting tries to estimate the residual growth interpreted as a measure of 
technological progress. The simple version of estimating the (Solow) residual or the so-called 
 total factor productivity (tfp) or  r is: 
r= Q* -[a L*+ bT* + (1-a-b) K*]                  {1} 
where Q* is growth of output,   L* is growth of labour input and T* is growth of  land and K* 
growth of capital, a is elasticity of output with respect to labour, b is elasticity of output with 
respect to land  and 1-a-b is  consequently (assuming constant returns) the output elasticity 
with regard to land. The interpretation of this equation is straightforward. Output growth that 
cannot be accounted for by (weighted) input factors must be explained by technological 
change, i.e. better use of the inputs. The elasticity parameters are usually  determined by 
factor shares assuming a link between share and productivity. 
Now the equation above seems to be very demanding in terms of information and it does not 
appear likely that you could get reliable information on all variables, however serious a 
researcher you were. The most problematic variable is Q, output. In pre-industrial times we 
did not have any estimates of  aggregate output, so an inference was usually made on the 
basis of population size or labour force, the latter assumed to be a constant fraction of 
population. That is, growth of output was linked to growth of population. However, if it is 
estimated that way, the whole growth accounting exercise becomes shaky since labour force 
growth is already included in the growth accounting formula on the input side. Persson and 
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Hoffman have tried different ways of getting around a direct estimate of output. Under 
simplifying assumptions, Persson  showed that there are two basic pre-industrial regimes. If 
all factors of production have equal growth rates, which would be the case during the first 
centuries of the post-Roman recovery and well into the second millennium, the formula above 
, equation (1) can be reformulated as: 
r = w* + (1+s)* - p*                         {2} 
where r as before is total factor productivity (tfp) growth, w* is wage growth,  s is the ratio of 
rents to wages and p* is change in price, the asterisk * signifies the proportional change in a 
variable. 
When land shortage sets in, the growth formula becomes: 
r= w* + (1+s)* - p* + b(K* - T*)                            {3} 
The advantage with the latter formulation is that not only can you get an estimate of r without 
a direct estimate of output but you can infer growth of K from the growth of the population, 
assuming that the amount of capital per capita does not change much or at all, and that growth 
of land is smaller than the growth of the population. Medieval sources are quite good in 
supplying  information about  prices and wages and population growth can be indirectly 
estimated from scattered records with some accuracy. However, information is not very 
precise. It would be desirable to work with a  margin of error. That is, instead of saying that 
growth of wages is 10 percent over a specified period we would prefer to include the standard 
deviation of that estimate. Persson did exactly that in estimating equation  (3) using English 
data. 
The analysis was applied to the agrarian sector in the pre-plague period in England, that is 
1250-1347, which, in traditional historiography, has been described as the prelude to a 
Malthusian crisis. A reiterative procedure, in which the equation was estimated 1000 of times, 
was adopted in which you entered values on all variables  but the actual value of a variable 
was picked randomly from an interval of values given by the expected value and its standard 
deviation. For example the annual growth in nominal wages had an expected value of 0.32 per 
cent per year in 1250 to 1347 and the standard deviation was 0.037 percent. That implies that 
the random selection of a value was from an interval of 0.283 to 0.357 percent. A similar 
procedure was adopted for the other variables. It is obvious that a precise number of for tfp 
growth is not obtained but rather a bell shaped distribution, as in Figure 9 below, where the 
estimated tfp-growth is around 0.17 to 0.39 percent per year with the most likely results being 
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around 0.25 to 0.3 per cent per year for the century before the Black Death. 
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Figure 9. Probability distribution of total factor productivity in English agriculture, 
1250-1347. 
r  
Source: K.G.Persson,Total factor productivity growth in English a
Discussion paper, 1993:11, Institute of Economics,University of C
 
Similar estimates were made for the post-plague period, 1350-145
growth despite the fact that land was then plentiful due to the dras
is obvious that these results do not lend support to a Malthusian in
economic history but indicate a depressive impact of the fall in ag
drastic decline in population. The scope for division of labour and
More importantly the results indicate that even in the case when th
manifest, as it was in the pre-plague period, technological change 
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throughout the ancién regime, tfp growth was a mere 0.01 per cent per year. Hoffman argues 
that exogenous shocks, wars and disorder severely interrupts the growth process and yields 
the low long run averages. The results referred to above in the analysis of medieval English 
growth are primarily based on data from the  south eastern part of England, quite close to 
London and which in many respects is similar to the Paris basin. 
 
Table 2. Total factor productivity in French agriculture, 1522-1789. Major regions. Per 
cent per year. 
  TFP Growth Rate (Percent/Year) 
Region Years Covered Overall Late Eighteenth Century 
Paris Basin 1520-1789 0.13 0.31 
Northeast (Lorraine) 1550-1789 0.13 0.13 
Normandy (near Caen) 1520-1785 0.01 0.01 
West 1611-1790 -0.16 -0.16 
Southeast 1580-1790 0.21 0.21 
Source: P.Hoffman, Growth in a Traditional Society, The French Countryside 1450-1815, 
Princeton University Press ,Princeton, 1996, Table 4.8, p. 130. 
 
Summarising these attempts to measure pre-industrial growth leaves us with the impression 
that tfp growth was around 0.1 to 0.3 per cent per year  in the pre-industrial era provided there 
was an absence of exogenous shocks and if resources and opportunities were reasonably well 
exploited. The results highlight great regional differences. As in the modern world, growth 
was not  shared by all.  
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Needless to say, these estimates are subject to great uncertainty. Can we find some other 
alternative method of estimation? If so, that alternative method could serve as an independent 
check. There is another way of indirect estimation which is based on the following common 
sense observation. To simplify the exposition, consider a closed economy with an agrarian 
sector feeding its own workers  and an urban population, that is a non-food producing 
population. Now it seems obvious that if we observe an increase in the non-food producing 
population relative to the agrarian population and without noting a decline in the per capita 
consumption of food,  then the increase in the relative size of the urban population must have 
to do with a productivity increase in the agrarian sector. Each farming household produces 
food for a larger number of townspeople. This common sense argument can easily be 
formalized to include foreign trade, changes in the propensity to consume food and non-food, 
income differences between town and countryside etc. One should be able to understand 
intuitively why it is necessary  to control for import of food, for example. If we observe that 
the proportion of urban occupations increases in total population, it might, in principle, only 
depend on the fact that the urban manufacturers export their goods against foreign food, and if 
so, this increase in the relative size of the urban sector need not reveal a productivity change 
in the economy’s own agricultural sector. Likewise, relative wages must be controlled for. 
Again urban growth might depend on the fact that wages and agrarian consumption in cities 
decline and therefore the inference that urban growth always implies agrarian  productivity 
growth is not correct. On the other hand, if urban wages and food consumption increase 
relative to agrarian wages, and controlling for foreign trade, that fact in itself reveals 
productivity advances in the agrarian sector without any change in the relative size of the 
urban professions. Finally, the impact of changes in the share of occupational groups, urban 
versus agrarian, crucially depends on the marginal propensity to consume agrarian goods. The 
higher it is, the higher will be the implied productivity change in the agrarian sector caused by 
a given increase in the relative size of the urban occupations. 
 
Do the results from an analysis along these lines lend support to the previously reported 
estimates? By and large the answer is yes. K.G. Persson investigated agricultural labour 
productivity changes ( which is identical to tfp-growth if it is defined as in equation (2)  
above and approximately equal but larger than labour productivity if tfp is estimated from (3) 
) in Tuscany (Italy) and the historical  Low Countries, now Northern France and Southern 
Belgium.22 Both areas were fairly advanced and similar to the Paris basin and   Southeast  
England. Estimates for the period 1100 to 1300 ranged between 0.1 to 0.25 per cent per year.   
It is worth stressing that these results do not imply that growth was equally strong in all parts 
of Europe. On the contrary, remote areas poorly integrated into urban networks probably 
fared less well. P. Hoffman=s research also suggests that variations in growth were very 
sensitive to social disorder. Wars and social unrest had a negative impact. A stable 
institutional framework  is a prerequisite for growth.  
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 Bob Allen has  used a method similar to the one just reviewed, see footnote 20, but for the 
period 1300-1800. He  confirmed  Hoffman’s  results  of  different growth patterns in 
different regions using a method of analysis similar to Persson . The results are summarized 
in Figure 10. Belgium, at that time not a nation state, but part of the highly urbanised Low 
Countries  region starts out as an early leader but with negative growth in the period. Unlike 
the Netherlands, Belgium cannot free itself from the stifling political domination  and 
religious intolerance of the Spanish crown which harms growth. Belgium loses one precious 
resource, human capital and skilled labour, which migrated to the Netherlands because of 
persecution. Not surprisingly the Netherlands which combined political independence around 
1600 with religious tolerance and growth promoting institutions became, in the words of Jan 
de Vries, the first modern economy. The first industrial nation, England, with an institutional 
set up similar to that in the Netherlands, also advanced in terms of agrarian labour 
productivity, almost doubling its output per agricultural worker in 150 years. 
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22 K.G-Persson, ‘Labour productivity in medieval agriculture: Tuscany and the Low Countries’ in 
B.M.S.Campbell and M.Overton, Land,Labour and Livestock, Historical Studies in European Agricultural 
Productivity, Manchester University Press, Manchester  1991, pp. 124-43. 
Figure 10. Output per worker in agriculture, 1300-1800. Various countries relative to 
England 1500 = 1. 
 
Source: R.C. Allen, ‘Economic structure and agricultural productivity in Europe, 1300-1800’ 
European Review of  Economic History, 4, 1, 2000, pp. 1-26.  
 
Other results are less optimistic. For example, France, stagnates which seems to contradict  
Hoffman’s results. However, Allen’s choice of large territorial states as units is averages the 
different growth performance in  subregions. In fact, Hoffman reported regions with negative 
and zero growth. This  highlights the idea advanced previously that  regions  and nations 
might operate below their technological capacity  and resource constraints. There is little 
evidence that resource endowments or access to  technology were fundamentally different in, 
say England and France to the extent that a 2:1 difference in labour productivity could be 
explained. In other words, we should look elsewhere for an explanation for why France was 
left behind. Growth inhibiting institutions, and  periods of internal disorder, are probably part 
of the answer. 
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What were the sources of pre-industrial  growth? It is clear that  radical changes in agrarian 
techniques were not experienced, but rather the slow  accumulation of new superior 
knowledge. Such knowledge referred to improved rotation schemes, and other improvements 
in soil and crops. A possible source is also increased specialization and the intensification of 
the use of time and soil. In the vicinity of urban areas where agrarian growth was most 
pronounced, there was both specialization and possibly longer hours when farmers could  add 
industrial plants, eg. flax or vegetables and poultry, to traditional crops. Strictly speaking that 
would not necessarily increase labour productivity as measured by output per labour hours. 
However it increased income per household and per labourer. We can also suspect that when 
households took the opportunity to work more it was because seasonal unemployment was 
considered undesirable. We encounter here again the idea  that a low level equilibrium might 
exist because of co-ordination failures which did not encourage the optimal level of 
specialization and work effort. 
Are labour productivity or tfp  growth rates of a magnitude of say 0.15 per cent per year over 
a long period, say from 1000 to 1750 plausible? 23 Yes! The implication is a threefold 
increase in income per capita, to be compared with  a twelvefold increase over 100 years if 
we take the average yearly growth rate to be some 2.5 per cent between 1900 and 2000. 
 
6. Wages and Income distribution. 
Can the general view of slow and sometimes interrupted  productivity growth be corroborated 
by evidence concerning the evolution of real wages? Since most of the productivity 
measurements concern  agriculture, we would need agrarian wages. And even if we had that 
we could not immediately interpret such a series  if we do not possess data on the way total 
agrarian income was divided between workers, peasants and  landowners. A decline in rural 
wages might reflect unchanged  labour productivity but with landlords increasing their share 
of total income. By and large the wages series that are available are urban wages of  building 
workers, which is a sector that is not known for spectacular productivity growth, not even 
during and immediately after the Industrial Revolution. Real wages of urban workers have in 
fact a rather ambiguous relationship to agrarian income  because, to obtain real wages, one 
                                                          
,23In some manufacturing activities, such as spinning, labour productivity probably 
increased with a factor of four between 1400 and 1700.  
 
 53 
deflates nominal wages with the a cost of living index largely composed of food prices. If 
urban real wages decline it might be because of an increase in food prices, which increased 
income for food producers. Since part of rural income is spent on urban goods and since 
urban goods’ prices fell relative to food,  the effect would be that  real wages in the urban 
sector fell while rural real income increased. The terms of trade of the rural sector would have 
improved. In the very long run one would expect that relative urban and rural wages revert to 
a stable (equilibrium) relationship. Urban wages are often found to be slightly higher than 
rural wages. However, it is useful at this point to remember the use of the concept equilibrium 
we introduced in section 3. Look at it as an attractor, that is, at any single  point in time the 
relative wage relationship  might be out of its equilibrium although it is reverting to it.  
Real wages were at a historical high by the mid 15th century, driven by the general labour 
shortage as a consequence of a century of declining population after the first outbreak of the 
Black Death. Workers not only negotiated higher wages and shorter hours, they were also 
benefiting from low agricultural prices. As the labour shortage eased  from 1450 to 1600, real 
wages generally dropped. However, urban labourers, probably adjusted to that by changing 
their diet, which was high in meat in the 15th  century and ate more bread and porridge in the 
16th century. As can be seen from Figure 11, the regional/national differences in real wage 
levels  largely reflect  the differences noted above across nations in terms of  agrarian labour 
productivity with cities in England and the Low Countries leading the  wage league.  
Despite the  differences in levels, it is worth stressing the  similarity in movements  across 
cities located in all parts of Europe. The similarities of movements in, for example, London 
and Istanbul, are noteworthy, both  entered a phase of slow increase some time in the 17th 
century which speeded up in the 18th century. However, the synchronization of wage 
movements between different  parts of Europe must not be interpreted as a sign of  integration 
in the  European labour markets. The phenomenon is rather the effect of a combination of   
fairly rigid nominal wages and  rudimentary integration of  European  food markets. 
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Figure 11.  Real wages of skilled construction workers in European cities 1450-1913. 
Wages in grams of silver divided by a consumer price index. 
  
Source:S. Özmucur and S. Pamuk, ‘Real wages and standards of living in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1489-1914’  Journal of Economic History, 62, 2, 2002, pp. 277-321.  
  
In turns out that our suspicion that falling or stagnating real wages of workers might have to 
do with changes in the distribution of income away from workers and in favour of the rich, 
whose income  originates from property. Figure  12 shows a  more unequal distribution of 
income accompanying the fall in real wages in the 16th and early 17th centuries in England but 
the same pattern are is apparent in the Netherlands and France. In fact, there seems to be an 
inverse relationship between changes in real wages and  changes in inequality, i.e.  a fall in 
real wages is associated with a rise in inequality and vice versa. 
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Figure 12. Movements in the cost of living in top income groups, relative to the cost of 
living in the bottom 40 percent or in workers’ households, England 1500-1986. 
 
 
Source: P. T. Hoffman, D.S. Jacks, P.A. Levin and P. Lindert, ’Real inequality in Europe 
since 1500’, Journal of Economic History, 62, 2, 2002, pp.322-55. 
Conclusion: A comparison between agrarian labour productivity and building wages 
confirms differences in levels across nations and regions in both series in the order of  
roughly 2 to 1. We should be careful in interpreting real wages as shadowing GDP/capita 
however, since wages are sensitive to changes in income distribution.   
        
7. Was there an Industrial Revolution? 
The concept of revolution suggests a radical and sudden transformation of economic life. It  is 
part of the folklore of the Industrial Revolution that it was associated with rapid growth and  
the widespread introduction of new technologies  and energy sources such as steam. While 
anybody living through the French Revolution, say, the period 1789- 95, could not miss it, 
and quite a few lost their heads, most contemporaries of the Industrial Revolution  were 
unaware of it. In fact, the concept was not invented until around 1850. We have already 
mentioned one of the contemporaries, Malthus, whose main concern was the inherent 
stagnation in an economy with limited resources and for whom  the possibility of sustained 
growth was impossible or exceptional. 
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Economic historians have, in recent years,  become increasingly dissatisfied with the 
traditional view of the Industrial Revolution. Some suggest that the concept itself is a 
misnomer. It is true that there were new technologies introduced but the pace at which they 
were adopted was much slower than previously believed and these technologies were not as 
quickly and  widely diffused as first believed. Many of these technologies took a long time to 
develop. Although the introduction of heat (and steam) as a source of energy and power 
(motion) had revolutionary implications, it took about two hundred years before the energy 
waste in early steam engines which was based on reciprocating motion, i e the back and forth 
motion of the piston, became energy saving through the steam turbine and rotary motion. 
During the  Industrial Revolution the major energy source for industry remained water power, 
and that is why the industries were called mills, i.e. machines were driven by water mills. Not 
until the mid 19th century did steam engines have an impact on transport but sail, which 
continued to increase in speed and efficiency, remained the dominant mode of sea transport 
until the late 19th century. What has been recognized now is that Industrial Revolution was 
limited to a revolutionary change in isolated sectors, specifically the textile industries, and to 
be more precise in the spinning and weaving of cotton cloth. In that process cotton replaced 
linen, which was a fibre not as easily adaptable to mechanized spinning as cotton. However 
spinning had been developed continuously since Medieval times. With hindsight some of the 
pre-industrial innovations might seem simple, such as introducing the foot treadle to drive the 
spinning wheel, which released one hand previously used to set the wheel in motion, or the 
mechanical winding of the yarn with a flyer. The reinterpretation of the Industrial Revolution 
also indicates that the technological changes that occurred were the result of trial and error 
rather than scientific discoveries. The innovators were skilled craftsmen rather than scientists 
and again it was not until the end of the 19th century, 100 years after the Industrial 
Revolution in England, that science entered as a major innovative force in production 
processes and in the development of new products.  
 
All this seems to stress  the continuity rather than the revolutionary impact of the economic 
changes in the period from 1770 to 1830. And, indeed, growth accounting has revised growth 
figures considerably. Table 3 below lists the conventional view represented by the pioneering 
work by Cole and Dean and  also the new results from the work of ´revisionist´economic 
historians such as Crafts and Harley. The results from recent revisions actually stress the 
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fairly small difference between pre-industrial and early industrial growth in the early phase of 
the Industrial Revolution. 
 
Table 3. Harley and Crafts versus Dean and Cole. Estimates of national product growth 
in Britain. Per cent per year. 
 Harley & Crafts Dean & Cole 
 National product Per head National product Per head 
1700-1760 0.69 0.31 0.66 0.45 
1760-1780 0.7 0.01 0.65 -0.04 
1780-1801 1.32 0.35 2.06 1.08 
1801-1831 1.9 0.52 3.06 1.61 
   
As can easily be seen, the major revisions concern the alleged industrial breakthrough period, 
i.e. 1780 to 1830, where per capita growth rates have been reduced to about 1/3 of the 
previous estimates. The main reasons why the new results differ from the old are (i) that 
previous estimates gave a much too high weight to the new  and fast growing industries in 
aggregate industrial output, for example cotton and iron as compared to old industries and (ii) 
 that the size of the industrial sector in the total economy was exaggerated. Since only a few  
new industrial sectors actually experienced a radical transformation and fast growth, the 
weights attached to different industries will have an important impact on overall growth. Not 
knowing the exact relative size of the modern industries, authors made different assumptions, 
usually overstating the actual weight of the new sectors. Another source of confusion over 
growth rates has to do with the familiar index problem. Using base year weights, as in a 
Laspeyres index, understates growth relative to an estimate based on end year weights, a 
Paasche index. Today authors tend to stick to Divisia index, which in some sense is an 
average of Laspeyres and Paasche indices. For example if you use sectorial value-added 
proportions from 1770, overall industrial growth would be 1.6 per cent per year up to 1801, 
but if you instead use 1801 value added shares, growth almost doubles to 3 per cent per year. 
The reason is, of course, that by 1801 the sectors that were relatively unimportant, but fast 
growing, in the late 18th century are increasing their share of industrial output. Attributing a 
too large share to a modern sector has then the obvious effect of overstating growth.  
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Is it reasonable then in view of these radical revisions of growth rates to speak about an 
industrial revolution? If you mean a quick and sudden change to higher growth rates, <a sharp 
upward turn [in growth rates]= as Ashton put it, the answer is No. Modern economic growth, 
say at levels of 1.5 to 3 per cent in per capita terms per year, prevailed in Britain from around 
mid 19th century and only by the end of the century in the rest of industrializing Europe.  
However, if by Industrial Revolution one means  great and profound change, the concept is  
more adequate but partly because the standards you apply in measuring great and profound 
are rather vague.  The concept has now become so firmly established that it is not worth the 
effort to abolish it. It needs to be re-cycled and given a slightly different  meaning than was 
implied by early scholars. Here is one, admittedly vague, attempt: The Industrial Revolution 
introduced changes with profound long run implications . For example,  the factory became  
the typical production unit in which human energy to a large extent was replaced by external 
sources of energy, first water mills and later steam. Furthermore, machines replaced or 
replicated human skills to an extent not seen before. Machines, the modern robot being the 
ultimate extension, were something different to tools which humans have known some 30-40 
thousand years. All in all, a radically new way of organizing work emerged. Factories had 
existed before but they were manufacturing factories rather than mills. New institutions that 
were helpful to economic growth developed, such as the limited liability company, the 
modern firm and a whole array of financial intermediaries that helped to channel resources 
from lenders to borrowers.24 The  new organization of work greatly facilitated the 
introduction of new inventions, simply because management of factories became a new 
specialized profession and because of the increased competitive environment following the 
destruction of the traditional manufacturing organization, the guilds, which restricted 
competition.  
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24 Was the particular ownership relation in the capitalist firm which characterized the 
industrial epoch also necessary for growth? Workers were hired to work at a fixed wage and 
owners claimed the residual income, if any. Why did this become the prevailing mode of 
organizing production? Why did capital hire workers and not the other way round? Was  it 
because capitalist firms were more efficient in their authoritarian leadership, and in their  
adaptability to a competitive environment which imposed instantaneous changes in the size 
and organization of the workforce and which the labour managed firm might have had 
difficulties in enacting? Or did the imperfection of early capital markets practically exclude 
workers from borrowing capital and setting up firms excluding them from learning 
management skills? As you can see these issues are not easily settled but the owner managed 
(capitalist) firm is  one of the innovations of the Industrial Revolution.  
So to some extent the Industrial Revolution  must be remembered, not for what it did 
accomplish in terms of growth but for what it promised to do in the future. 
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Appendix 1. 
A note on Malthus, technological change and long term population growth. 
 
Standard model: One good, food, two factors of production, land in fixed supply and labour. 
There are diminishing returns to the variable factor, labour. Population growth is a positive 
function to income per head, henceforth called wage. No technological change. 
Prediction:. As long as the land constraint is not binding wages are above subsistence and 
population growth is positive. When diminishing returns set in, wage and population growth 
decline until wages hit subsistence level and population growth stops. 
Steady state: Constant population at subsistence wage. 
Standard model with positive technological shock: A single technological shock will lead 
to a transitory rise in wages above subsistence but the story from the Standard model repeats 
itself. 
Steady state:  Constant - higher than before the shock -  population and wages at subsistence 
level. 
This population pattern does not fit  European population history. 
Characteristics of European population history over the last 1000 years: Variable rates of 
positive population growth interrupted by exogenous negative population shocks, for example 
the Black Death. Short run population dynamics: population reverts to trend growth. 
How do we explain that pattern? 
First  introduce positive ( possibly low) and permanent technological progress into the model 
as done in K.G Persson,  Pre-industrial Economic Growth, Oxford 1988, chapter 3, and 
rigorously proved in the Appendix to that chapter.  
Steady state: There are a number of steady states, 1,2,3...n, of positive population growth and 
wages above subsistence, such as for a given rate of diminishing returns there is a steady state 
1 characterized by a constant rate of technological progress a and a constant, above 
subsistence wage b and a positive constant rate of population growth c. There is a steady state 
2 that for the same rate of diminishing returns as in 1 exhibits the following characteristics: a 
constant rate of technological progress d higher than a, a constant wage e higher than b, and a 
constant  population growth f higher than c. There is a steady state 3, etc. 
Prediction: Economies typically attain different steady states defined by a combination of 
positive population growth and above subsistence income level depending on the rate of 
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technological progress. 
Although this model has a Ricardian element - diminishing  returns to the variable 
factor - and a Malthusian -  population growth as a positive function of wage level - it is 
manifestly anti--Malthusian in spirit and  in its prediction of continuing positive 
population growth throughout history. 
An empirical anomaly: Several modern economic historians ( R. Allen,  P. Hoffman and K.G. 
Persson) have demonstrated growing wage or  income per head in the pre-industrial period for 
selected regions/nations over long periods, say  centuries. How do these findings fit into the 
model just presented? 
One argument maintains that these economies  have a positive (possibly slow) rate of 
technological progress and as long as the land constraint is not binding, diminishing returns 
are absent: income per head will grow. The problem with this explanation is that there is a 
clear inverse relationship between the land/labour ratio on the one hand and growth and 
income on the other. The most advanced  regions in pre-industrial Europe were the Low 
countries (northern France, Belgium, Netherlands), south east England, northern  Italy and 
they had high urbanization proportions in total population , around  25% and low land/labour 
ratios. 
Is there a solution to this puzzle? Try this! 
First: Forget about the one good, closed economy model. Advanced regions in pre-industrial 
Europe exploited gains from inter-regional and international trade and specialization. 
(Parmesan cheese was available in Brussels in the 15th century).  Diminishing returns were 
held at bay by land-scarce regions specializing in labour intensive agriculture, labour 
intensive  soil improvements and intensive use of land: more crops per year and unit of land 
made possible by animal dung  and  nightsoil from  nearby cities. Specialization increased  
the number of cultivated plants which permitted  rotation schemes that was less exhausting on 
soil.  
But why was  the whole of pre-industrial Europe not as rich as the advanced regions? This is 
an important question and the answer is perhaps not different from the answer to the question: 
Why is  the whole world not developed today?   
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Suggestions for further reading: 
 
The references listed below are by no means meant to be exhaustive. Only a few major  
studies have been quoted but any one of them will  give the interested reader an overview of 
the relevant literature and further references. 
 
On pre-industrial economic growth and institutions: 
The modern restatement of the Ricardian and Malthusian interpretation of pre-industrial 
economic growth is H.J. Habakuk, The economic history of modern Britain, Journal of 
Economic History, 18, 1958, pp. 1484-501. 
A forceful critique is found in G. Grantham, Contra Ricardo: On the macroeconomics of pre-
industrial economic fluctuations, European Review of Economic History, 2, 1999 with useful 
references. 
See also K.G. Persson, Pre-industrial Economic Growth.  Social Oorganization and 
Technological Progress in Europe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988 and P. 
Hoffman, Growth in a Traditional Society. The French Countryside 1450-1815, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995. 
On demographic change: 
Massimo Livi-Bacci, A Concise History of World Population, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992. 
 
On the reinterpretation of the Industrial revolution: 
N.F.R. Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985. 
N.F.R. Crafts, Exogenous or endogenous growth?The Industrial revolution reconsidered, 
Journal of Economic History,55, 1995, pp. 745-72. 
J. Mokyr (ed.) The Economics of the Industrial Revolution, 2nd Edition, London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1998. 
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